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Introduction
This paper presents a model of foreign direct investment (FDI) that consists of both green…eld FDI (building of a production facility abroad) and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Most of the horizontal FDI literature describes FDI as green…eld FDI. It explores the trade-o¤ between the bene…t of economies of scale of producing at home versus the bene…t of producing abroad and foregoing the payment of the variable costs of trade like transportation costs and tari¤s. The bulk of FDI however belongs to cross-border M&A activity, over eighty percent in 1999 according to UNCTAD (2000) , or according to Head and Ries (2008) for the years between 1987 and 2001 two thirds of total FDI. I thank Paul Segerstrom for his advice and thorough discussion of the paper. I am also grateful to David Domeij, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud and Yoichi Sugita for useful comments and suggestions as well as participants at the European Trade Study Group meeting in Copenhagen, the Sprimg Meeting of Young Economists in Mannheim and seminar participants at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. Financial support from the Wallander Foundation and the Fritz Thyssen Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
y Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Hindenburgufer 66, D-24105 Kiel, Germany ignat.stepanok@ifw-kiel. de 1 When looking at total M&A activity, cross-border and domestic deals, cross-border activity also constitutes a signi…cant share. According to Gugler et. al. (2003) for the period 1981-1998, cross-border mergers as a share of all mergers were 10:6% in the US, 29:9% in the UK, 33:5% in continental Europe, 52:6% in Japan, 30:0% in Australia, New Zealand and Canada and 28:5% in the rest of the world.
In order to study the e¤ect of policy on FDI, it is important to properly model its composition and …rms'incentives to chose a particular mode of entry into foreign markets. The purpose of this paper is to model FDI not only as green…eld investment but also as cross-border M&A. The paper does not investigate domestic M&A activity.
In the literature on FDI composition and trade, mergers are modeled in an oligopolistic setting as in Neary (2009) , where the incentive to merge is based on strategic motives (merging …rms reduce competition), exploiting complementarities among merging parties (…rm headquarters with a speci…c entrepreneurial ability and a production facility with a separate productivity) in a monopolistically competitive market as in Nocke and Yeaple (2007) and (2008) or in an oligopolistic market as in Norbäck and Persson (2007) and (2008) . The current model suggests a di¤erent incentive for …rms to merge: transfer of technology and managerial expertise from the more productive …rm to the less productive one. There are three empirical regularities related to FDI that the model …ts: …rst, green…eld investors are more productive than M&A …rms. Second, the model generates two-way ‡ows of both M&A and green…eld FDI. Third, the closer are the two countries, the more green…eld FDI is chosen over M&A as a mode of entry.
I build a model with heterogeneous productivities as in Melitz (2003) . There are two symmetric economies Home and Foreign. When a …rm is "born" it draws a marginal cost from an exogenous distribution. Depending on how productive it turns out to be, it has several options to choose from: (i) to not enter any market, (ii) to enter only its local market, (iii) to enter its local market and to export to Foreign, (iv) to enter its local market and to merge with (take over) a …rm abroad, or (v) to enter its local market and to invest in a new plant in Foreign that will allow it to produce its product abroad. Each of those choices are optimal depending on where on the productivity distribution a …rm is. I solve the model for an equilibrium where the least productive …rms choose (i), the more productive choose (ii), ... and the most productive choose option (v).
This ordering is certainly not arbitrary. Empirical evidence shows that exporters are more productive than non-exporters (see Bernard and Jensen (1999) , Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000) and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998)), …rms engaging in FDI are in turn more productive than exporting …rms (see Girma, Kneller and Pisu (2005) , Helpman (2006) ) and within the group of …rms choosing FDI as an option for entering the foreign market, the more productive ones are involved in green…eld FDI (see Nocke and Yeaple (2008) ). The ordering is also supported by Ra¤ et. al. (2011) who look at Japanese …rm-level data.
In line with the theoretical literature on trade and …rms with heterogenous productivities (in particular Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) ), I connect the choice to enter a market, both local and foreign, with a one-time payment of a …xed cost. The magnitude of the …xed costs determines the productivity necessary to enter or not and if yes how (choices (i) through (v)). Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) have in addition to the usual …xed costs for entering the local market and for exporting a third one. This is the …xed cost for building a plant abroad. The innovative aspect of this paper is to introduce one more …xed cost: for merging with a foreign …rm. Once the merger is completed, the home investor can use the production facilities of the foreign …rm. A home …rm can therefore enter the foreign market in one of three ways, by exporting, by merging with (acquiring) a foreign …rm or by building a plant there.
Home …rms …nd it optimal to acquire failing foreign …rms since the bene…t from the knowledge transfer in that case is greatest. The acquirer pays the …xed cost for the merger and is randomly assigned to a failing …rm. The new restructured plant has a productivity inbetween the productivities of the two merging entities. The bene…t from the merger is split according to a Nash bargaining solution.
When Renault took a third ownership in Nissan in 1999, it installed one of its top managers, Carlos Ghosn, as Nissan's CEO. He restructured Nissan and brought it back to pro…tability. It is this transfer of expertise and technology that I model. According to Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) management practices are an important source of …rm productivity, where …rms with better management are more productive and larger.
I …nd in line with the existing literature that lower variable costs to trade allow for more …rms to become exporters. In comparison to Melitz (2003) , in my model there are two more productivity thresholds, one that separates exporters from …rms involved in M&A and the other the threshold dividing …rms involved in M&A and …rms that open their own factory abroad (green…eld FDI). Lower variable costs to trade reduce total FDI mostly at the expense of M&A …rms, which in turn results in a higher share of green…eld investment in total FDI.
The next section lays out the model. Section three gives the solution and section four discusses the results. There is also an appendix where the more involving calculations are spelled out.
The Model
In the model there are two symmetric economies (countries) Home and Foreign, a single consumption good sector with Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition. The size of population in each country is exogenous and does not grow. Labor is the single factor of production, the labor market is perfectly competitive and there is no unemployment. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor, which is inelastically supplied. There is no unemployment in the economy. Firms invest to discover new varieties of products. This investment represents a one-time product development …xed cost. After the …rm incurs that cost and discovers a product, it draws its marginal cost from a given distribution.
To enter the Home and Foreign markets, there are certain exogenously given …xed costs to be paid, all of them paid in terms of labor units. Every choice of entry is associated with the payment of a …xed cost while exporters in addition face iceberg trade costs when shipping goods to the foreign market. Instead of exporting, a …rm can choose to take over a foreign …rm and use its production facilities. The bene…t for the acquiring …rm is not only to be able to gain a foothold for its product on the other market, but it also transfers part of its productivity to the less productive foreign …rm. Some …rms choose instead of exporting or taking over a foreign …rm to establish their own plant abroad. 3 
Consumers
The representative consumer has a CES utility function given by
where m c is the measure of varieties available in the Home market, x(!) is the amount an individual consumes of a particular variety ! and the degree of di¤erentiation between products is determined by 2 (0; 1). Products are gross substitutes with an elasticity of substitution 1=(1 ) > 1. Solving the optimisation problem gives the following demand function:
where
is an aggregate price index, c is individual expenditure and p(!) is the price of product !.
Producers
To create a new product variety, a …rm needs to pay a …xed cost equal to F I labor units. After the invention of a new variety, the …rm draws a marginal cost parameter which indicates how many labor units it takes to produce a unit of the good. The marginal cost parameter is drawn from a Pareto distribution which has a probability density function g(a) with support 0; The model will generate several marginal cost thresholds which determine whether a …rm enters a market or not and if it does, how, by exporting, by acquiring a …rm abroad or by building a new plant. I use at some places throughout the text productivity instead of marginal cost, keeping in mind that low marginal cost corresponds to high productivity.
Given a particular marginal cost draw a(!) for producing the new variety !, a …rm makes the following pro…ts selling in its local market:
where p L is the price a …rm holding the patent for product variety ! sets on its local market and x L (!) is demand for that locally manufactured product. Using (1) and C cL as aggregate expenditure, I obtain that the optimal price is p L (!) = 1 a(!) and local pro…ts are
1 .
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A …rm makes the following pro…ts selling in its export market:
where > 1 is an iceberg variable cost to trade and x E (!) is demand for an exported product !. Optimisation yields p E (!) = 1 a(!) and exporting pro…ts are
I can express the relation between pro…ts from selling on the local market and from exporting as E = L , where
1
. The case of autarky corresponds to = 0 and free trade to = 1.
Value Equations and Marginal Cost Cuto¤s
There are four types of producing …rms. The …rst type is those that sell only at home, their value will be denoted by v L (a). The second type is those that sell at home and export, with value v L (a) + v E (a), where v E (a) is the value of the exporting section of a …rm's operation. There also are …rms that sell at home and have merged with a foreign …rm. They have value
, where a 0 is the productivity of the foreign plant. The fourth type is those …rms that sell at Home and have a subsidiary abroad. They have value 2v L (a), since they sell one product on two markets without paying any variable costs to trade and the subsidiary plant has the same productivity as the plant in Home.
Each …rm faces an exogenous exit probability equal to . The value of a home operation of a …rm is therefore
The value equation for the exporting section of a …rm must equal
From (3), (4) and
Let the value function from selling in the local market net of the …xed cost of entering the local market be
Let the marginal cost below which …rms …nd it optimal to enter their local market be a L . Firms with marginal cost draws of a 2 (a L ; _ a) will not be able to cover the …xed cost for entering the local market F L and will therefore not enter. The value of the …rm with the threshold marginal cost net of the …xed cost to entering the local market must equal the value of a failing …rm for now written v F :
The way the the value of the failing …rm is written, it is independent of its marginal cost draw. This follows directly from the M&A technology introduced below.
Mergers and Acquisitions
The industrial organisation literature has emphasised two main motives for a merger: e¢ -ciency gains and strategic motives. By strategic motives one has in mind reducing competition in a market where …rms are not atomistic and a¤ect the behavior of others. In my model with monopolistic competition, each …rm is in…nitely small and its merger with another …rm does not a¤ect the behavior of other …rms. Without dismissing the importance of strategic interactions between …rms in oligopolistic markets, I focus my attention on e¢ ciency gains through transfer of knowledge and study this as one of the possible channels through which variable costs to trade can a¤ect the composition of FDI.
There are several assumptions that I make regarding the M&A process. The …rst one is that the acquiring …rm pays a …xed cost to initiate a merger. The …xed cost can be seen as a fee for a consultant to evaluate and facilitate the merger, the cost of restructuring the foreign enterprise and facilitating its entry in the foreign market.
Let a h be the marginal cost of a home …rm that acquires a foreign target. The restructured foreign enterprise will have a marginal cost
where z < 1. This restructuring technology has the desirable property that a 0 is an increasing function of a h . It is a simplifying assumption to not tie a 0 to the marginal cost of the target …rm. A possible extension could be to use a Cobb-Douglas technology, where a 0 would depend positively on both a h and the marginal cost of the target …rm.
The third assumption I make is that one plant can produce only one product. The marginal cost draw of a plant is tied to the product and that can not be improved. In case of a merger a product can be produced in Foreign with a di¤erent from its original marginal cost in Home, however that new marginal cost is lower, za h . Firms therefore do not sell more than one product. This simpli…cation focuses the attention on that aspect of cross-border mergers that deals with the combined incentive of gaining foothold in a foreign market and transfer of knowledge/technology to a foreign plant in order to make it more productive.
The acquiring …rm can merge with any foreign …rm, including failing …rms. Let a a be the marginal cost of the acquired …rm. If the acquired …rm is more productive than the acquirer, a a a 0 , then the acquired …rm's product will be kept. There would be no transfer of knowledge to the new bought enterprise nor would it facilitate the acquirer to gain foothold in the foreign country. There would be no bene…t, but there would be the cost for the merger. If the acquired …rm is su¢ ciently less productive than the acquirer however (to be precise, less productive than the potential restructured plant, a a > a 0 ) then there will be a gain from the transfer of knowledge and the product of the acquired …rm will be divested. The product of the acquirer will be produced. Given however that a 0 does not depend on a a , it would be optimal to merge with a …rm that has the lowest productivity, or highest marginal cost, since in that case the loss from the divested product would be lowest. It follows that the acquiring …rm would target only failing foreign …rms, provided that there is a su¢ cient number of failing …rms.
A su¢ cient number of failing …rms would mean that the number of acquiring …rms is smaller than the number of target …rms, thus every …rm that wishes to take over another …rm abroad can …nd a failing …rm to do so. I solve for an equilibrium where this holds.
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Let a failing …rm have marginal cost a f 2 (a L ; _ a). The restructured plant will have a marginal cost in between the marginal costs of the acquiring and acquired …rms a h < a 0 < a f if a h < za L for all a h . I solve for an equilibrium where the last inequality holds.
A great number of …rm mergers in Eastern Europe in the 1990s were negotiated to save failing state enterprises. As part of a privatisation process, the governments were looking for foreign investors, which had the capability to increase those failing …rms'productivities and to save them from bankruptcy. It is true that not only failing …rms are being targeted in the M&A market. In my setup the failing …rms can also be described as plants with low productivity that belong to larger …rms consisting of several plants, each with its own unique productivity. In this case mergers could be seen as a part of the process of …rms buying and selling corporate assets. The main point is that a less competitive enterprise is being bought and restructured through which process it acquires a higher productivity. In a study of M&A activity in Canada and the US around the time of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement from 1989, Breinlich (2008) …nds that acquiring …rms are bigger, more productive and more pro…table in comparison to target …rms.
The empirical literature does report gains from mergers. Jensen (1988) cites empirical evidence from the M&A literature, that takeovers "generate substantial gains: historically, eight percent of the total value of both companies."The gains are not redistribution from one …rm to another, but rather improved e¢ ciency. Mandelker (1974) …nds evidence that mergers can be seen as a mechanism through which the market replaces incompetent management, thus increasing e¢ ciency. Conyon et. al. (2002) …nd that …rms that are acquired by foreign companies show an increase in labor productivity of 13%.
I should reiterate that this monopolistically competitive setup abstracts from any strategic gains from a merger, which very well might present an incentive to merge with …rms that are above the entry threshold productivity. There are setups where acquirers would cherry-pick local …rms. I therefore do not claim to capture all possible gains or aspects of the cross-border M&A activity. The gain from a merger in my model comes from two sources i) the acquired …rm obtains a lower marginal cost of production: e¢ ciency gains, can be seen as technology or knowledge transfer between …rms 1 ii) the acquiring …rm gains a foothold in the foreign market for its product and uses the acquired …rm's production plant abroad.
The last assumption I make on the M&A process is that the gain from the merger is split between the acquiring and the target …rm as a result of bargaining. Let the bargaining game be of the Rubinstein type (see Binmore et. al. (1986) for details). Both the acquiring and acquired …rms do not have an immediate outside option. The value of the restructured enterprise will be v L (a 0 ). The Nash solution to the bargaining problem assigns a share 0 < < 1 of the gains from the merger to the acquiring …rm and a share 1 to the target …rm, where the parameter represents the bargaining strength of the acquiring …rm.
When a …rm invests to merge with another …rm abroad, it will pay the …xed cost F M and will be randomly assigned to a failing …rm. The precise productivities of …rms are not known when the investment F M is made. After the …xed cost for initiating the merger has been paid and …rms have been matched, productivities are revealed and the two …rms enter negotiations on how to split the proceeds from the merger.
Entering the Foreign Market
There are three ways a …rm can enter the foreign market: through exporting, acquiring a foreign …rm or building a plant abroad. Let the function f E (a) v L (a) F E represent the value of exporting net of the …xed cost of entering the export market, f G (a) v L (a) F G represent the bene…t of green…eld FDI net of the …xed cost of building a plant abroad and
v L (a 0 ) F M represent the bene…t of a merger (a share goes to the acquirer) net of the …xed cost for initiating the merger.
Note that v L is proportional to a
1
. The functions f E , f M and f G are all de…ned as functions of a but when graphing these functions, it is convenient to think of them as functions of a 1 , since they are all upward-sloping and linear in a . In all three functions, marginal cost a enters only through the term a 1 , which can be seen as a measure of productivity (marginal cost raised to a negative power). The functions f E , f M and f G are illustrated in Figure 1 and are drawn so that the …rms with lowest marginal cost choose green…eld FDI (a 2 (0; a G ) or a . This is not the only possible equilibrium for which one can solve, but it is the one I am interested in, in order to …t the empirical evidence on …rm productivity and preferable mode of entry into foreign markets cited in the introduction.
For the ordering of outcomes illustrated in Figure 1 to occur, I need to assume that
Also the slope of f G must be steeper than that of f M , which in turn must be steeper than that of f E . For that to hold, I must have that
Firms with a new product before they draw a marginal cost are of mass _ m=G(a L
. Therefore the probability of being taken over is
. When I solve for the steady state equilibrium, I make sure that 0 < < 1
holds. The value of a failing …rm equals the likelihood with which that …rm will become a takeover target times the share from the gains from a merger, times the expected gain. The expectation is taken with respect of a h , since a failing …rm does not know the marginal cost of a potential match:
In order to …nd
As shown in the appendix, substituting for the value function from (3) and then for pro…ts from (2) yields
Strictly speaking " is the probability of a failing …rm being taken over , times the expected productivity of the potential acquirer E a 1 h divided by a measure of the productivity of a …rm that is indi¤erent between entering its home market or not a 1 L . The value of the foreign operation of an exporter with the cuto¤ marginal cost for entering the foreign market (denoted by a E ) must be equal to the …xed cost that it needs to pay to Melitz (2003) . Substituting for the value function from (3) and for pro…ts from (2) yields
As illustrated in Figure 1 , the value from entering through a merger is lower than from entering as an exporter for less productive …rms (a 
. I substitute into this expression for the value functions and for pro…ts from (2) and (3) to obtain
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A similar argument goes for determining the threshold marginal cost separating the …rms that choose to enter with a merger from those that built their own plant abroad. For higher marginal cost values …rms would prefer to enter by means of a merger, but the …rms with lowest marginal cost …nd it more pro…table to enter by green…eld FDI. Let's call a G the marginal cost cuto¤ where f G (a G ) = f M (a G ). Substituting for the value functions and pro…ts yields
The formal derivation of all marginal cost cuto¤s is provided in the appendix. I solve for an equilibrium where
holds. As I show in the appendix, in addition to (5) and (6), the following conditions must be satis…ed for (13) to hold:
Condition (14) is similar to the one in Melitz (2003) ensuring that the more productive …rms self-select into becoming exporters. At an intuitive level, it is reasonable to assume that a …rm needs to pay a higher …xed cost for entering a foreign market than for entering its local market. Inequality (15) is more restrictive than F M > F E in (5). F M has to be su¢ ciently larger than F E . This is a reasonable assumption, meaning that it is signi…cantly more costly to negotiate a merger than to enter the foreign market as an exporter. Condition (16) says that F G has to be su¢ ciently larger than F M , or in other words, the cost to build a plant abroad must be su¢ ciently higher than the cost of negotiating a merger.
The Incentive to Develop a Product
To determine the incentive of …rms to develop varieties, the bene…t of innovating a product must be equal to the cost. The cost is F I labor units. The expected bene…t is a bit more involving to describe. First, upon drawing an unfavorable marginal cost a > a L , the …rm becomes a takeover target with a probability and gains a share 1 from the proceeds of the merger. Second, given the …rm draws a marginal cost low enough to enter its local market a < a L , there is the expected bene…t of selling there after paying the …xed cost to enter F L . Third, for a marginal cost within the range a 2 (a M ; a E ), in addition to selling in its local market, the …rm pays a …xed cost F E and starts exporting. Fourth, for a marginal cost within the range a 2 (a G ; a M ), the …rm pays the …xed cost F M and merges with a foreign failing …rm, obtaining in the process a share from the gains of the merger. Lastly, for a marginal cost a 2 (0; a G ), the …rm pays a …xed cost F G and builds a plant abroad. The bene…ts are summarised on the right-hand side of the equation below:
The …rst integral represents the gain from a merger to a failing …rm taking also into consideration the likelihood that the …rm will draw a marginal cost within that range. The second integral shows the bene…t from selling in the local market minus costs for entering it. The third, fourth and …fth integrals describe the bene…ts from entering the foreign market (net of …xed costs) depending on the …rm's chosen mode of entry. After substituting for and using
da, which allows me to rewrite it further as
can therefore rewrite my original incentives to enter equation after combining the …rst and fourth integrals as
I group the …xed costs on the left-hand side, divide both sides by G(a L ) and de…ne
I then substitute for v L (a) from (3), for pro…ts from (2) and de…ne
to obtain
This is the equation de…ning the incentive to develop a product. The left-hand side can be seen as the cost of developing a variety and the right-hand side as the bene…t.
Solving for the Aggregate Price Index
I continue with …nding an expression for the aggregate price index within a country P , which satis…es
In the equation above g(a)=G(a L ) is the steady state density function conditional on entry. The …rst integral denotes the prices of all local originating …rms with a productivity a 2 (0; a L ). Foreign originating …rms with productivity a 2 (a M ; a E ) export to home and sell at p E (a). Their contribution to the price index is captured by the second integral. The next integral describes the prices of all foreign …rms that have merged with a home failing …rm. Prices charged by those …rms are based on the marginal cost of the restructured plant a 0 . Line four describes the contribution to the price index of foreign …rms that have a subsidiary at home. Substituting for prices, rearranging and then substituting for yields:
Steady State Labor Market Clearing
Labor is inelastically supplied and employed either for payment of the …xed costs, a total of L I , or in the production sector, a total of L P . Total labor supply can be expressed as L = L P + L I . Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor and receives a wage w = 1 per unit of labor supplied. Labor markets are perfectly competitive and there is no unemployment. Total workforce in production is given by the sum of labor producing for the local market and labor producing for the foreign market. For brevity, I write a(!)x L (!) as ax L . To produce a variety for the local market, a …rm needs ax L units of labor. To produce a variety for the export market, a …rm needs ax E units of labor. Let x 0 (!) be demand for a locally produced product with marginal cost a 0 (!). I will for brevity write this demand as x 0 . Labor involved in production is
The …rst integral expresses what is produced by all non-failing …rms for the local market. The second integral takes into consideration what is produced for exporting. The third integral takes into consideration what is produced by the formerly failing local …rms that were taken over by a foreign …rm. The fourth integral takes into consideration the production of subsidiaries of foreign …rms. I substitute for x L , x E , x 0 and for to obtain:
The full employment condition L = L P + L I implies that:
Aggregate income equals aggregate labor income L plus aggregate income from pro…ts C= , minus wages paid for labor used for the …xed costs L I . I show in the appendix that C= is aggregate income from pro…ts. I move on to labor dedicated to the …xed costs …rms have to "pay". The labor dedicated to discovering a new product is F I . The mass of …rms that discover a product is _ m=G(a L ). Total labor cost for the creation of new products is therefore
enter the local market and are productive enough to pay F L , hence the total labor cost to the economy from entering the local market is
Again, of all …rms that have discovered a product only a fraction enter the foreign market and pay the F E …xed cost. This fraction is
. Hence the cost paid by those …rms is
of all …rms that have entered pay the …xed cost to take over a foreign …rm
The total amount of labor busy with activities related to the …xed costs is therefore:
From the de…nition of F x it follows that L I = _ mF x . Keeping in mind that the in ‡ow of varieties equals the out ‡ow _ m = m it follows that
Solving the Model
I proceed with …nding a L . I substitute in (8) for the price index from (19) and obtain:
In the incentive for product creation condition (18), I substitute for the the price index from (19) and obtain
Next, using the de…nition of and solving for the integrals, I can write as a function of
where q 1 () is a function of a L de…ned in the appendix. I assume that k > 1 to guarantee that the integrals converge and is …nite. Combining (22) and (23) yields
. I substitute for from (24) to obtain
from (17), substituting for the cumulative distribution functions yields a second expression for F x = q 2 (a L ), where q 2 () is a function of a L de…ned in the appendix. Combining the two expressions for F x gives an equation, which I can solve to obtain a solution for a L :
I can substitute the expression for a L , which solves (25) into the de…nition of " (9) and …nd ". Using " in (25) would give me a L . Given a L , I know from (24), a E , a G and a M from (8), (10), (11) and (12) .
To …nd C, I substitute for L I from (21) and for C= from (23) in (20), and obtain C = L. What remains is to …nd m. I substitute for C = L and for
This completes the solution of the model.
Results
I …rst …nd the share of green…eld FDI in total FDI. Firms are born and make a decision about which markets to enter and how. There is a constant ‡ow of resources towards M&A and green…eld activity. The resources dedicated to M&A are
is the share of all local entrants _ m engaged in M&A and F M is how much each …rm that invests pays for a merger. Similarly, the total value of green…eld FDI is
is the share of all local entrants _ m that choose to build a plant abroad and F G is the investment made by each of those …rms. The share of green…eld investment, denoted by , is measured by green…eld FDI value divided by the sum of green…eld and M&A value:
Dividing the numerator and denominator by G(a L ) results in an expression that depends
due to the fact that the former is directly a¤ected by variable costs to trade. From the group of newly entering potential FDI …rms it is only M&A …rms that choose to become exporters instead in a world with lower . The value of green…eld FDI can both decrease or increase but the overall decrease in total FDI comes mostly at the expense of M&A …rms, thus leading to their lower share in total FDI #. Proposition 1 Bilateral trade liberalisation " leads to a higher share of green…eld FDI in total FDI ".
Empirical evidence in Nocke and Yeaple (2008) suggests that greater geographical proximity increases the share of green…eld investment in total FDI. While Nocke and Yeaple (2008) show this result assuming that greater proximity means lower …xed costs for building a factory abroad (their model does not have variable costs to trade), I am able to show the same result in a model with variable costs to trade. It is more natural to think of geographical proximity as lower transportation costs rather than …xed costs of entry.
In order to have a complete picture of the model and show how the remaining endogenous variables move as a result of trade liberalisation I solve the model numerically.
Numerical solution
In this subsection I look for the e¤ects of trade liberalisation on the marginal cost cuto¤s, on the share of …rms that export denoted by
and on total FDI. In order to obtain the value of total FDI, I add the values of M&A and green…eld investments
For the calculation of those it is not enough to know the sign of @" @ but also its magnitude relative to ". The expressions become quickly non-tractable, which calls for the numerical solution.
In my computer simulation, I use the following parameter values: = 0:714, k = 3:735, z = 0:9, = 0:5, a = 10, F I = 1, F L = 0:5, F E = 0:6, F M = 18, and F G = 50. The rate of substitution between products is set at = 0:714. This choice results in an elasticity of substitution of = 3:49, within the bounds of the estimates in Broda and Weinstein (2006) and a 40% markup, within range of the evidence presented in Basu (1996) and Norrbin (1993) . Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2008) use data on exports and domestic sales by French …rms and …nd that k=( 1) = 1:5. To match this evidence, given my choice of , I set the parameter of the Pareto distribution at k = 3:735. The parameter determining the productivity of the restructured foreign plant after a merger relative to the productivity of the parent …rm, denoted by z, has to be smaller than one. In combination with the parameter determining the bargaining power of the merging …rms , I set them so that < z 1 < 1 (inequality (6)) holds.
The maximum marginal cost a …rm can draw, a, is a scale parameter and I set it equal to 10.
2 Particular …xed cost values are chosen according to (14) , (15), (16), (5), (7), also making sure that after solving for a L , I am left with a L < a. The …xed cost for entering the local market F L is smaller than the one for entering the foreign market as an exporter F E , which in turn is smaller than the …xed cost for initiating a merger F M . The most costly mode of entry abroad is by building a plant F G . I evaluate the model for a change in from 1:9 to 1:5 (or changing from 0:20 to 0:36). At low values of there would be no FDI and all …rms would prefer to export. The results from solving the model numerically are shown in Table 1 . The marginal cost cuto¤ for …rms entering their home market a L increases as a result of trade liberalisation. It is interesting to note that this e¤ect on a L is the opposite to the one found in Melitz (2003) . The decision of a …rm to enter or exit its local market is based not only on its ability to pay the entry …xed cost but also on its exit value v F when becoming a potential takeover target, which equals the probability of a merger times the expected gain. Lower leads to an increased competition from a larger number of exporters ( "), thus decreasing a L as in Melitz (2003) . Lower leads however also to a lower probability of being taken over # and an altogether lower expected gain from choosing to become a takeover target " #. This makes exit less attractive and more …rms prefer to enter the local market, thus increasing a L . The second channel is in this case stronger leading to the higher a L .
By looking at the column for the percentage of …rms that export , one can see that the majority of …rms are non-exporters in equilibrium. This is what Bernard et. al. (2003) …nd in their study of 200; 000 US manufacturing plants, where only 21% report exporting. Intuitively, as exporting becomes more pro…table # the share of …rms engaging in exporting increases ".
As previously shown lower transportation costs # lead to a greater share of green…eld FDI in total FDI ", where = 51% at = 1:9 and = 76% at = 1:5. This number is consistent with the data reported in Head and Ries (2008) , where green…eld FDI is roughly one third of total FDI. The total amount of FDI decreases z # as predicted by the proximity concentration trade-o¤.
Conclusion
I develop a model of international trade and foreign direct investment, where FDI consists of cross-border mergers and green…eld FDI. I abstract from any strategic motives for a merger, since I work with …rms in a monopolistically competitive environment. The incentive for …rms to merge comes from the transfer of technology and managerial know-how. Exporters are more productive than non-exporters. Firms that engage in FDI are more productive than exporters and within the group of FDI …rms, it is the most productive ones that become green…eld investors.
Both green…eld FDI and cross-border M&A exist simultaneously and go both ways from Home to Foreign and from Foreign to Home. This is not present in Nocke and Yeaple (2008) , which is the model closest to mine when it comes to the results on FDI composition it generates. In their model of asymmetric countries, M&A ‡ows both ways. Green…eld FDI however goes only from the richer to the poorer country, while as income di¤erences between the two countries become smaller, green…eld FDI decreases. Given their setup, there would be no green…eld FDI between equally developed economies, which is clearly at odds with the evidence.
In the current model greater proximity to the foreign market increases the share of green…eld FDI. In order to generate this result , Nocke and Yeaple (2008) assume that the …xed cost for opening up a factory abroad is lower, the smaller the distance to the foreign country. Given that my model has iceberg trade costs (not present in Nocke and Yeaple (2008) ), I believe that it generates that particular result in a more natural way, thinking of distance as a¤ecting variable rather than …xed costs.
I substitute for v L (a L ) using (3) and for pro…ts using (2):
I can write
where for brevity
Using this I can go back to the equation for a L and rearrange terms:
This is equation (8) in the main text.
I substitute for v L (a E ) from (3) and for pro…ts using (2) to obtain
Rearranging terms yields equation (10) in the main text:
I substitute for v L using (3) and for pro…ts using (2):
Rearranging terms yields equation (11) in the main text:
To solve for
Rearranging terms yields equation (12) in the main text:
For (13) to hold, the following three conditions must be satis…ed: (8) and (10) imply that
This is condition (14) in the main text. Second, for a M < a E or a (10) and (11) imply that
This is condition (15) in the main text. Third, for a G < a M or a (11) and (12) imply that
This is condition (16) in the main text.
Steady State Labor Market Clearing
I …rst calculate labor involved in production:
To produce a variety for the local market a …rm needs to use ax L labor units. Using (1) yields ax L = ap L (a) P 1 C, where I have used aggregate consumption C = cL. I substitute for the optimal price p L (a) = 1 a to obtain ax L = a 1 1 P 1 C. For exporting, a …rm produces with ax E = ap E (a) P 1 C labor units, where I use (1) to substitute for demand. Substituting for p E (a) = . The local …rms that were taken over by a foreign …rm need a 0 x 0 units of labor. Using (1) to substitute for demand yields
Going back to the expression for L P , I obtain
I substitute for P 1 to obtain
The full employment condition L = L P + L I implies that L = 1 C + L I , which in turn leads to equation (20) in the main text
To show that C= is aggregate income from pro…ts, I integrate over the pro…ts of all companies originating from a country and denote that value as :
Substituting for P 1 yields = C= .
Solving the Model
Next I …nd an expression for in one unknown a L . Using the properties of the Pareto distribution
and the de…nition for gives:
The assumption that k > 1 guarantees that the integrals converge and is …nite. Lower values of k would result in explosive pro…ts for marginal costs close to zero. Using k= (k + 1) and solving the integrals yields
To …nd (a E =a L ) k +1 , I use (8) and (10):
To …nd (a M =a L ) k +1 , I use (8) and (11):
To …nd (a G =a L ) k +1 , I use (8) and (12):
I de…ne for brevity k= ( 1) and write
. I substitute for the above three ratios of the threshold marginal costs into the expression for to obtain
This is equation (24) in the main text where q 1 () is the expression in brackets and is a function exogenous variables and a L . In (17) I substitute for the cumulative distribution functions
From (8), (10), (11) and (12) 
Substituting the above three ratios of the threshold marginal costs into the expression for F x yields an expression in a L and exogenous variables only, which I write for brevity as F x = q 2 ().
Showing @ @ > 0 I use the de…nition of and rewrite it as
:
